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I. INTRODUCTION
"Our Ambition: Opening New Resources to Benefit Humanity"I
With those words, the United States National Commission on Space
(the "Commission") opened its recently-released report, setting forth an
ambitious fifty-year space program for the exploration of the inner solar
system and the development of the mineral resources thought to exist on
the Moon, Mars, and the asteroids.2 These resources are known or
thought to include oxygen,3 silicon,4 carbon, calcium, aluminum, iron,
titanium, manganese, magnesium, chromium, water, nitrogen,5 and hy-
drogen.6 The asteroids located within the main belt between Mars and
Jupiter alone are thought to contain a rich variety of materials in suffi-
cient quantities to "support a civilization many thousand times larger
than the Earth's population." 7 The Commission recommended that
1 NAT'L COMM'N ON SPACE, PIONEERING THE SPACE FRONTIER 3 (1986) [hereinafter NAT'L
COMM'N REP.].
2 Id. at 5.
3 Oxygen is thought to appear in the lunar soil at a level of approximately 40% by weight. Id.
at 85.
4 Silicon is thought to appear in the lunar soil at a level of approximately 20% by weight. Id.
5 The Martian Moons of Phobos and Deimos are known to possess varying amounts of water,
carbon, and nitrogen. Id. at 86. In fact, the National Commission on Space has called the moon
Phobos an "orbiting fuel depot just 6,000 miles above the red planet." Id.
6 Id. Before the National Commission on Space undertook its investigation, many scientists
anticipated that needed benefits could be derived from extraterrestrial resource development. For
example, in 1977 Dr. Brian O'Leary suggested that both the Apollo-Armour Class (earth orbit-
intersecting) and main-belt asteroids were feasible for mining. B. O'LEARY, ASTEROIDAL RE-
SOURCES FOR SPACE MANUFACTURING (American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics, Paper
No. IAF-77-77, 1977). Scientists long ago determined that there were dozens, possibly hundreds, of
mineral rich asteroid bodies which cross the earth's orbit and may be reached through current
launch technology. A single asteroid, composed almost entirely of solid nickle iron, might satisfy
"years of global demand for these elements." Condara, Outer Space, Like the Sea and the Air, Whose
Frontier?, 6 Hous. J. INT'L L. 175, 178 (1984).
7 NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 88. While discussion of this issue within this Article
generally focuses on the development and exploitation of "hard" mineral resources (such as metals),
other resoures of interest are also located in outer space. For example, serious thought has been
given to constructing, and placing in earth orbit, a solar power generation satellite capable of both
storing massive amounts of solar energy and delivering that energy to receiving, storage, and retrans-
mission stations on earth. See id. at 82-83; Comment, Law in a Vacuum: The Common Heritage
Doctrine in Outer Space Law, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 416 n.146 (1984) (citing Com-
ment, Orbital Saturation: the Necessity for International Regulation of the Geosynchronous Orbit, 9
CAL. & WEST. INT'L L.J. 139, 139 n.2 (1979)) [hereinafter Comment, Law in a Vacuum]. In the
past, the Center for Space Policy, a for-profit organization which evaluates proposed space ventures,
has rejected the argument that by the year 2000, annual revenues from commercial space activities
may equal $50 billion and may involve areas as diverse as materials processing (primarily related to
pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, crystals, and glasses), communications and remote sensing satel-
lites, flight and launch systems, payload servicing, and ground-based aeronautical support services.
The mineral resources obtained from extraterrestrial mines theoretically would be available for
earth-based uses and markets. These resources, however, would be used principally in space to allow
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steps necessary to undertake the development of such extraterrestrial re-
sources begin at once.
Many have suggested that the mining of the asteroids is already
within our technological reach. Robert A. Frosch, past Administrator of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA") stated in
1980 that, while efforts had to be taken to develop new transportation
systems prior to conducting large-scale mineral recovery activities in
outer space, "[b]ased upon NASA studies to date, there are no insur-
mountable technological impediments to the exploitation of extraterres-
trial resources."' It has even been suggested that certain materials might
be mined more easily on the Moon than in Antarctica9 or on the deep
seabed.10 Consistent with these predictions, the Commission called for
the establishment of pilot mining and production facilities on the Moon
by the year 2007, only twenty years from now. A principal recommenda-
tion of the Commission with regard to these activities was that "wher-
ever possible, the private sector be given the task of providing specific
services or products in space, and be free to determine the most cost-
effective ways to satisfy those requirements ... ."I1
It is clear that the world community in general, and the United
States in particular, intends to move forward in the exploration of space12
further exploration. Applications might include radiation shields, glasses for specific structure for-
mations and propellants for both known rocket technology and more exotic mass-driven and solar
energy propulsion systems. The construction of space structures first centers around silicon, alumi-
num, and iron resources known to exist on the Moon, followed by the materials thought to exist on
the asteroids, such as carbon, iron, nickle, cobalt, chromium, platinum, osmium, rhodium, rhemium,
and irridium. Hearings on the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37
(1980) [hereinafter Moon Treaty Hearings] (statement of Dr. Robert A. Frosch, then Administrator
of NASA). Even after taking into account the costs of extraterrestrial mining operations, the in-
space development of these resources for in-space use is far more efficient than the development of
earth's resources for in-space uses because the energy required to bring materials from the Moon or
the asteroids to useable earth orbit is only a small fraction of the energy required to lift those same
resources from the earth itself. See NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 7.
8 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 54 (statement of Dr. Frosch); see also Hartman, Mines
in the Sky Promise Riches, A Greener Earth, 13 SMrrHSONIAN 71, 73 (Sept. 1982).
9 Interview with Andrienne Stephan, Polar Affairs Officer, Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs,
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dep't State (July 21,
1986).
10 Interview with Brian Hoyle, Director, Office of Oceans' Laws, Bureau of Oceans and Interna-
tional Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dep't State (July 17, 1986).
11 NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 1, at 11.
12 In his 1984 State of the Union Address, President Reagan announced that he was:
directing NASA to develop a permanently manned Space Station and to do it within a decade
.... We want our friends to help us meet these challenges and share in their benefits. NASA
will invite other countries to participate so we can strengthen peace, build prosperity, and ex-
pand freedom for all who share our goals.
President's State of the Union Address, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 87, 90 (Jan. 25, 1984).
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and the commercial exploitation of lunar and other resources. It would
seem equally clear that, without law in this area, no country, govern-
ment, or commercial enterprise is likely to undertake the substantial risks
and costs involved in such exploitation.I3 Companies will not undertake
these risks without a clear understanding of how the resulting rewards
will be allocated. For the United States commercial space program to
move forward, it must seek the adoption of a regime to govern such ac-
tivities which will be accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity. The purpose of this Article is to provide a short description of
why past efforts to adopt such an international regime have failed. The
Article will contrast the currently successful efforts to adopt an interna-
tional regime to regulate mineral resource activities in a similarly inhos-
pitable environment - Antarctica - and to suggest terms of a regime
that the international community might find acceptable.
II. BACKGROUND
Efforts to explore and regulate resources recovery activities in Ant-
arctica and outer space share a common origin: the International Geo-
physical Year ("IGY"). The IGY was the thirty-month period from July
1, 1957, to December 31, 1958, during which approximately seventy
countries - employing over 30,000 scientists - undertook coordinated
scientific research studies of the earth and its environment. 4 The IGY
was the direct result of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's efforts to fos-
ter, in the midst of the "cold war," cooperative efforts among the world's
nations, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
IGY was characterized by "remarkable good will and harmony" between
the participants 5 which was likely the result of its organization by an
international union of scientists, rather than by political leaders.' 6
Interestingly, two programs initiated during the IGY were the
13 See Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 5 (statement of Roberts B. Owen, Dep't State);
Note, Antarctica Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compromise, 11
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 45, 69-70 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Resource Jurisdiction]. As eloquently
stated by Professor Rodolphe De Seife: "'Business must know where it is at and where it is going. It
is important, ab initio, for business to know what it can do, what it cannot do, and how it is to be
done." De Seife, Star War or Star Peace: The Impact of International Treaties on the Commercial
Use of Space, reprinted in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, THE LAW AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF
SPACE 102 (NLCPI Monograph, 1986).
14 V ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPEDIA 388 (1974). The information gathered during
the International Geophysical Year studies are set forth in over 30 volumes of ANNALS OF THE
INT'L GEOPHYSICAL YEAR. See Comment, Legal Aspects: Exploitation of Antarctic Resources, 33 U.
MIAMI L. RF.v. 371, 378 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Legal Aspects].




United States and Soviet competitive satellite launch programs. These
undertakings led to the discovery of, among other things, the Van Allen
radiation belt. 7 The IGY also fostered the establishment of numerous
research bases on the Antarctic continent by the United States, the Soviet
Union, and nine other countries. 18 In contrast to the superpowers' space
race, the Antarctic research efforts were characterized by unique cooper-
ation and lack of competition among the participating parties. Indeed,
the countries established the Antarctic research bases without regard to
preexisting sovereignty claims over various portions of the continent
made by numerous countries.19
At the same time studies and exploration of outer space and the
Antarctic continent started, efforts began to establish mechanisms and
regimes to regulate such activities. These efforts were undertaken princi-
pally to protect the delicate environmental conditions existing in those
areas and to avoid disputes among the world's nations regarding sover-
eignty claims and rights to exploit resources that might be discovered in
the areas. On May 3, 1958, for example, after the Soviet Union an-
nounced its intention to remain in that portion of Antarctica previously
claimed by Australia following the end of the IGY, the United States
invited eleven other countries (ten of which had established research ba-
ses in Antarctica) to participate in discussions regarding the future of the
Antarctic continent.2" The resulting Antarctic Treaty was signed by
these parties in Washington on December 1, 1959.21
Two weeks later, on December 13, 1959, the General Assembly of
the United Nations turned its attention to space and adopted a resolution
establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(the "Committee"). The Committee's directive was to study and report
on the legal problems which might arise from space-based activities.22
17 Id.
18 The countries establishing bases in Antarctica during the IGY included Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Chile, France, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Soviet Union, and the
United States. Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 14, at 378 n.46.
19 Prior to the IGY, portions of the Antarctic Continent had been claimed by Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Id. These claims, although
held in abeyance pursuant to the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, continue today. See infra text
accompanying notes 122-24.
20 United States Proposes Conference on Antarctica, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 910 (1958). In addi-
tion to the countries that had established bases in Antarctica during the IGY, supra note 18, the
United States invited the Union of South Africa to participate in the discussions. See Comment,
Legal Aspects, supra note 14, at 378 nn.46, 49.
21 Thirteen Nations Signed Treaty Guaranteeing Non militarization of Antarctic and Freedom of
Scientific investigation, 41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 911 (1959). The Antarctic Treaty was entered into
force on June 23, 1961. 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
22 G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/5414 (1958). TheAdHoc
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The Committee convened in May 1959 and, on June 25, 1959, issued its
report calling for the creation of a permanent, standing committee of the
United Nations to pursue and assure the peaceful uses of outer space.23
The General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution on Decem-
ber 12, 1959, and established a United Nations Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS").24 Since that time, COPUOS has
successfully secured the adoption of four international agreements gov-
erning nonterrestrial activities of state parties.
III. TREATIES GOVERNING UNITED STATES OUTER SPACE
ACTIVITIES
A. The Principles Treaty
The first and most comprehensive treaty governing outer space ac-
tivities is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (the "Principles Treaty")." The Principles Treaty em-
bodies three guiding principles which have governed the United Nations'
efforts to regulate space-based activities since the IGY: 1) that interna-
tional law and the Charter of the United Nations should apply to outer
space activities; 2) that space should be free for exploration and use by all
states; and 3) that outer space should not be subject to national appropri-
ation or sovereignty claims.26 In pursuit of these goals, the Principles
Treaty recognizes in its preamble "the common interest of all mankind in
the progress and exploration and uses of outer space for peaceful pur-
poses" and that "the exploration and use of outer space should be carried
on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of economic and
scientific development."27 Article I of the treaty similarly states that the
exploration and use of outer space should be carried out "for the benefit
and in the interest of all countries" and that outer space shall be deemed
"the province of all mankind."28 The treaty further provides that outer
space shall be free for exploration and scientific investigation,29 shall not
Committee consisted of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, In-
dia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, Great
Britain, and the United States. Id. See also Jessup & Taubenfeld, The United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 53 AMER. J. INT'L L. 877 (1959).
23 U.N. Doc. A/Ac.98/SR.6 (1959).
24 G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 6) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
25 Principles Treaty, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force with respect to the United States on Oct. 10, 1967).
26 G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
27 Principles Treaty, supra note 25, at Preamble.




be subject to national appropriation by a claim of sovereignty,3" shall not
be the scene of nuclear weapons and shall be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes,3" and that the parties to the treaty shall be guided by the prin-
ciple of cooperation and mutual assistance.32
The Principles Treaty was an important step in international rela-
tions because it was the first cooperative effort to regulate activities in
outer space and rejected the historical concept of terra nullus with regard
to the exploration of celestial bodies. This international legal principle,
applicable to discovery of unclaimed terrestrial land masses, permits a
state party to obtain sovereignty over an area by effective occupation.33
As of this date, twenty countries have ratified and are bound by the Prin-
ciples Treaty.34
B. The Astronaut Rescue Agreement
The next treaty signed by the United States governing space explo-
ration activities was the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (the "Astronaut Rescue Agreement"). 35 The Astronaut Rescue
Agreement furthered the cooperative nature of international ventures in
outer space by obligating all states party to it to render all required aid
and assistance to distressed astronauts 36 and to return to the state of
launching all space objects coming into the possession of parties to the
agreement.37 The Astronaut Rescue Agreement provides that each party
receiving information that the personnel of a spacecraft has suffered an
accident must immediately notify the launching authority either directly
or through public announcement, must take all steps to aid in the rescue
of the astronauts landing in their territory, and must cooperate in the
rescue efforts of the launching authority if the launching authority's
assistance would effect a more prompt rescue.38
30 Id. art. II.
31 Id. art. IV.
32 Id. art. IX.
33 See G. SCHWARZENGERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 644 (5th ed. 1967).
34 These countries include Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, the
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Japan, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Republic of Korea, Sierra
Leone, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Arab Republic, Great Britain, and the United States.
35 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force with respect to the
United States on Dec. 3, 1968) [hereinafter Astronaut Rescue Agreement].
36 Id. art. 1. The Principles Treaty already had designated astronauts as "envoys of mankind."
Principles Treaty, supra note 25, art. V.
37 Astronaut Rescue Agreement, supra note 35, art. 4.
38 Id. arts. 1-2.
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C. The Liability Convention
The third treaty successfully adopted through the efforts of
COPUOS was the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (the "Liability Convention").39 The Liability
Convention defines various circumstances under which liability will
arise. It provides, for example, that a launching state shall be "absolutely
liable" to pay compensatory damages for harm caused by its space ob-
jects on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight.' As to damage
caused elsewhere, liability is apportioned on the basis of fault, with the
launching state being liable only if the injury is caused by its fault or the
fault of persons for whom it is responsible.4" The convention also appor-
tions liability and responsibility for damages arising from the activities of
more than one state42 or where the injured party is guilty of gross negli-
gence or intentional misconduct.43 The convention is not applicable to
injury caused to nationals of the launching state or to nationals of third
party states which participate in the launch of the space object causing
damage.' The convention also calls for the creation of a Claims Com-
mission to resolve conflicting claims as to damages caused by a space
object if the parties involved in the dispute cannot reach a settlement
within one year.4"
D. The Registration Convention
The most recently adopted international agreement applicable to
United States space exploration efforts46 is the Convention Governing the
39 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Sept. 1, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 (entered into force with respect to the United States on Oct. 9, 1973)
[hereinafter Liability Convention].
40 Id. art. II.
41 Id. art. III.
42 Id. arts. IV, V.
43 Id. art. VI.
44 Id. art. VII.
45 Id. arts. XIV-XX. In the United States, the Administrator of NASA has been delegated the
responsibility for determining domestic damages not covered by the Liability Convention. National
Aeronautics and Space Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2733-34 (1985) [hereinafter NAS Act].
46 There are numerous other bilateral and multilateral agreements to which the United States is
a party and which apply to this country's use of outer space but which are not directly applicable to
mineral exploration or exploitation activities. See, e.g., the Agreement Relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organizations ("INTELSAT"), Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813,
T.I.A.S. No. 7532; Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization ("INMAR-
SAT"), Sept. 3, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 9603. Similarly, the United States is a member of
the International Telecommunications Union, which undertakes to regulate the uses of the electro-
magnetic spectrum both terrestrially and by satellite to assure noninterference among users and uses.
International Telecommunications Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572.
See infra text accompanying notes 189-91.
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Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Registration
Convention"). 7 The Registration Convention requires launching states
to maintain a registry of objects launched into earth orbit or beyond and
to supply that list to the Secretary General of the United Nations along
with information regarding the objects' flight trajectories, orbital param-
eters, and intended purposes.48 The Registration Convention, like the
Principles Treaty, Astronaut Rescue Agreement, and Liability Conven-
tion, recognizes in its preamble "the common interest of all mankind in
furthering the exploration and use of outer space for peaceable
purposes."
IV. THE MOON TREATY
In 1979, COPUOS proposed the adoption of a fifth treaty to govern
activities in outer space - the Treaty Governing the Activities in Outer
Space, on the Moon, and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Moon Treaty").4 9
The perceived need for a regime governing the exploitation of lunar re-
sources arose from the return of lunar materials (moon rocks) during
NASA's Apollo Lunar Landing Program and the general recognition of
the feasibility of larger scale resource exploitation activities.5" In 1970,
Argentina submitted to the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS an early
draft of a treaty to govern activities by state parties on the moon.51 It
was not until 1979, however, that the parties to COPUOS reached a con-
sensus as to the present version of the Moon Treaty. 2 On December 5,
1979, notably with the United States and other developed countries ab-
staining, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Moon
Treaty by a unanimous vote.53 The treaty entered into force on July 11,
1984.
The Moon Treaty repeats the general policy statements appearing in
the prior treaties. These statements call for international law and the
Charter of the United Nations to govern activities on the Moon,5 4 state
that the Moon and other celestial bodies should not be subject to national
47 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480; 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force on Sept. 15, 1978).
48 Id. arts. II, IV.
49 G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 77, U.N. Doc. A34/46 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Moon Treaty].
50 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 11 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen).
51 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.71 (1970).
52 See REUNEN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF OUTER SPACE 133-51 (1976).
53 See Griffin, Americans and the Moon Treaty, 46 J. AIR L. & COMM. 729, 735 (1981). Thus
far, the Moon Treaty has been signed by Austria, Chile, France, Guatemala, India, Morocco, the
Netherlands, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, and Uruguay.
54 Moon Treaty, supra note 49, art 2.
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appropriation by a claim of sovereignty,55 provide that the Moon shall be
used exclusively for peaceful purposes,56 maintain that there shall be
freedom of access to the Moon for scientific investigations and to infor-
mation obtained from such investigations,57 and prohibit activities dis-
rupting the Moon's environmental balance.58 Unlike the Principles
Treaty (which sets forth only general principles governing the explora-
tion of space) or the Astronaut Rescue Agreement or Liability and Re-
gistration Conventions (which impose relatively noncontroversial
obligations on their signatories), the Moon Treaty seeks to impose spe-
cific obligations upon parties undertaking the exploration or exploitation
of lunar 59 resources.
For example, the Moon Treaty specifies that the exploration and use
of the Moon "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all
countries, irrespective of the degree of economic or scientific develop-
ment,"6 and that "due regard shall be paid to the interest of present and
future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of
living ... ."" The most controversial provisions of the treaty appear in
Article 11 which, among other things, states that "the Moon and its nat-
ural resources are the common heritage of mankind, which finds its ex-
pression in the provision of this Agreement ... in paragraph 5 of this
Article." 62 Paragraph 5 of Article 11 states, in turn, that "States Parties
to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime,
including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natu-
ral resources of the moon as its exploitation is about to become feasi-
ble."63 Paragraph 7 of the same article adds that:
the main purpose of the international regime to be established shall include:
... (d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived
from those resources, whereby the interest and needs of the developing
countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed
either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given
special consideration. 64
55 Id. art. 11, 1 2-3.
56 Id. art. 3.
57 Id. art. 6.
58 Id. art. 7.
59 Just as the Moon Treaty provides that references to the "Moon" shall be deemed to include
references to other celestial bodies, Moon Treaty, id. art. 1, 1, reference to the "Moon" or "lunar"
resources herein should be deemed to include references to the other celestial bodies and their re-
sources, including the asteroids.
60 Id. art 4, 1.
61 Id.
62 Id. art. 11.
63 Id. art. 11, 5.
64 Id. art. 11, 7. The Moon Treaty additionally provides that it is to be reviewed ten years
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A. The Common Heritage of Mankind
The concept that certain locations and resources are the common
property of mankind was not newly proposed or adopted in the Moon
Treaty. In fact, the concept that certain property could be commonly
owned by the international community was raised by T. W. Balch in
1910, when he suggested that Antarctica "should become the common
possession of all members of the family of nations."65 The theory that
Antarctica cannot be owned by any one nation has been followed consis-
tently by the United States since that time.6 6  In 1952, Oscar Schachter,
Assistant Director of the Legal Department of the United Nations, sug-
gested similar treatment in space such that: "[O]uter Space and the Ce-
lestial Bodies would be the common property of all mankind over which
no nation would be permitted to exercise its dominion."'67  In 1958,
United States Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge
told the United Nations that a principal goal of the United States was to
assure that "outer space will be used solely for the benefit of all man-
kind."168 President Lyndon B. Johnson expressed similar sentiments in
1966 when he said that the international deep seabed was the "legacy of
all human beings" which should be protected from "unfettered
harvesting. 69
The development of the common heritage concept into a principle of
international law was advanced by United Nations Ambassador Arvid
Pardo of Malta in 1967 when he described the ownership that should
apply to deep sea resources.7" At the time, Ambassador Pardo stated
that property considered the common heritage of mankind "should be
after it enters into force, or in 1994, as part of the provisional agenda of the United Nations. Id. art.
18.
65 Carroll, Of Icebergs, Oil Wells, and Treaties: Hydrocarbon Exploitation Offshore Antarctica, 36
STAN. L. REv. 207, 219 n.75 (1984-85).
66 See Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. V, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71
(entered into force as to the United States on June 23, 1961) [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty].
67 Matte, Limited Aerospace Natural Resources and Their Regulation, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE
L. 379 (1982) (quoting Schachter, Who Owns the Universe?, reprinted in SPACE LAW - A SYMPo-
SiUM, U.S. Senate, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 17 (1958)).
68 Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement Governing the
Activities ofStates on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L LAW. 429, 449 (1980). The
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1985 itself states that activities in outer space "should be
devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." NAS Act, supra note 45, § 45 1(a). The
Principles Treaty, the Astronaut Rescue Agreement, and the Liability and Registration Conventions
all state that outer space is the "province" of, and is to be developed for the "benefit" of, "all
mankind."
69 White, The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Assessment, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 509,
516 n.61 (1982) (citing N. REMBE, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 38 (1980)).
70 G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 14, U.N. Doe. A/67/16 (1967).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:727(1986)
... administered by an international authority for the benefit of all peo-
ples .... "7 1 In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon made a similar propo-
sal that all resources in the deep seabed should be regarded as the
common heritage of mankind, to be held in trust by the adjacent coastal
state, with the revenues of the trusteeship to be apportioned between the
trustee state and an international seabed authority. 72 Argentina submit-
ted a concrete proposal for the application of the common heritage prin-
ciple to lunar resources in a proposed treaty it submitted to the COPUOS
Legal Subcommittee in 1970. 7' The United States also incorporated the
principle in a draft moon treaty it submitted to the United Nations for
consideration in 1972. 74 In fact, the United States draft concisely stated
that "the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall
be the common heritage of all mankind.
75
B. Objections
Notwithstanding the United States' initial subscription to the com-
mon heritage principle, the interpretation of the provision by developing
countries during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the 1982
Convention on the Law on the Sea ("LOS") quickly caused the United
States and other developed countries to abandon the principle and the
draft Moon Treaty. 76 The United States took the position that the com-
mon heritage principle only denoted that access to land subject to the
principle would be available to all, but did not embody any substantive
71 White, supra note 69 at 516 (quoting Pardo, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea?, 62 AM. Soc. INT'L
L. PROC. 216, 225-26 (1968)).
72 Id. at 518 (citing 1 T. KRONMILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING 33
(1978)).
73 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/85, Annex 2, at art. 1; U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.71 at Correction 1
(1970). For a detailed description of the common heritage principle in the Moon Treaty, see Chris-
tol, supra note 68, at 454-65; White, supra note 69, at 521.
74 G.A. Res. 2340, supra note 70, at 14. See also Comment, Law in a Vacuum, supra note 7, at
419 n.185 (citing Smith, The Moon Treaty and Private Enterprise, 18 ASTRO. & AERO 62, 65 (1980)
and Cocca, The Advances in International Law Through the Law in Outer Space, 9 J. SPACE L. 13, 15
(1981)).
75 U.N. Doc. A/AC, 105/C.2 (XI)/Wolling Paper 12; U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/196 Annex I, at
23 (1977). See Menter, Commercial Space Activities Under the Proposed Moon Treaty, 7 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. 183, 188 (1979-80).
76 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 12 (statement of Roberts B. Owen); Carroll, supra
note 65, at 219; Comment, Law in a Vacuum, supra note 7, at 421. Groups opposing adoption of the
treaty included the Mineral Resources Law Section of the American Bar Association, The National
Association of Manufacturers, The Aerospace Industries Association, The National Ocean Indus-
tries Association, and many individual corprations including United Technologies, Inc., and Kenne-




rules or a predetermined legal regime to regulate activities.77 The devel-
oping countries, on the other hand, interpreted the principle as incorpo-
rating three central concepts which the United States found adverse to its
own interests: 1) the absence of private ownership rights in the property
deemed to be the common heritage of mankind; 2) the management of
such property by a multinational body; and 3) the benefits flowing from
use or exploitation of the property to be shared among all the world's
nations, regardless of whether they participated in the exploitation
activities.78
The principal concern of the United States was that incorporating
the common heritage principle into the treaty would result in the devel-
oper of lunar resources losing control over those resources, a possibility
that would discourage development. As stated by Marne A. Dubs, then
Chairman of the American Mining Congress' Committee on Undersea
Mineral Resources:
For a majority of nations, "common heritage" has come to symbolize a
system in which complete international control over access to, and the dis-
position of, important natural resources is exercised so as to effect the trans-
fer of wealth, technology, and political control from the industrialized
countries to the developing countries.79
C. The Law of the Sea Analogy
The position of those opposed to the United States ratification of the
Moon Treaty received support from the developments at the LOS negoti-
ations, which were conducted concurrently with the United States' con-
sideration of the Moon Treaty. 0 Many participants feared that the
terms of the regime adopted in the LOS governing deep sea mineral re-
77 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 12 (statement of Roberts B. Owen).
78 White, supra note 69, at 535 (citing Borghese, Preface to the Emerging Ocean Regime, in
PACEM IN MARIBUS 161-62 (1971)).
79 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 134 (statement of M. Dubs, Chairman, American
Mining Congress Committee on Undersea Mineral Resources). Northcutt Ely of the Natural Re-
sources Law Section of the American Bar Association ("ABA") stated: "The expression 'common
heritage'... has come to mean... property which is owned by the U.N. agency created by treaty,
and subject to private acquisition only with the consent of the new supranational regime [which is
dominated by the Soviet Block and Third World]." Id. at 84. See also De Seife, supra note 13, at
102 (another common heritage interpretation suggests that industrialized nations should pay to de-
velop space for the benefit of all nations); Dula, Free Enterprise and the Proposed Moon Treaty, 2
Hous. J. INT'L L. 3, 19-20 (1979).
80 Final Act of The Third United Nations Conference on The Law of the Sea, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Pub. No. E. 83. V.5 (1983) [hereinafter LOS]. Currently, 25 states have
ratified the LOS and 104 additional countries have signed it. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, GIST, LAW OF THE SEA (June 1986). It is likely that the LOS will be ratified by
the requisite 60 countries, and thus be enforceable, before the end of this decade. Oxman, The New
Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A.J. 156,162 (1983).
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covery efforts8" would reappear in the regime proposed in the Moon
Treaty governing similar exploitation of lunar resources.12
Basically, the LOS common heritage regime applies to the "Area,"
defined in the agreement as "the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" specified in the LOS.83
An International Seabed Authority (the "Authority") is created by the
LOS and is charged with the responsibility to license and regulate min-
eral exploration and exploitation in the Area.84 The LOS also creates its
own intergovernmental mining company (the "Enterprise"), to partici-
pate in the exploration and exploitation of resources in competition with
private companies licensed by the Authority to develop the Area's
resources.
85
The LOS is similar to the Moon Treaty in that the LOS specifies
that the resources in the Area are "the common heritage of mankind,"8 6
and are not subject to claims or exercise of national sovereignty. Fur-
thermore, activities in the Area are to be carried out under the LOS:
for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical loca-
tion of States... and taking into particular consideration the interest and
needs of developing States and of peoples who have not obtained full inde-
pendence or other self-governing status .... 87
The LOS provides that access to resources may be granted only by li-
cense from the Authority88 and that parties to the convention are prohib-
81 The principal resource thought to exist on the deep sea floor is polymetallic nodules lying at
or near the surface of the deep sea ocean beds, particularly in the Pacific and, to a lesser degree,
Indian Oceans. The nodules contain nickel, manganese, cobalt, copper, and traces of other metals.
Id. at 160.
82 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 78 (testimony of Leonard J. Theberge, Chairman,
Section of International Law, ABA). Most opponents of the Moon Treaty believed it was clear that
the developing countries viewed the regime to be adopted as intended to secure a fundamental redis-
tribution of wealth from North to South. Id. at 83 (ABA Natural Resources Section Report).
83 LOS, supra note 80, arts. 1, 13, 55-76. The LOS delineates specific areas of national jurisdic-
tion in the oceans and seabeds. Specifically, each state bordering the oceans enjoys a "Territorial
Sea" of up to 12 nautical miles from the shoreline, over which the coastal state has absolute sover-
eignty, id. art. 87; a "Contiguous Zone" extending past the territorial sea of up to 24 miles from the
shoreline, over which the coastal state may exercise control necessary to enforce customs, immigra-
tion or sanitary laws, id. art. 33; an "Exclusive Economic Zone" ("EEZ") extending up to 200 miles
from shore, over which the coastal state has the exclusive right to conserve, manage, and exploit all
resources found therein, id. arts. 55-75; and a "Continental Shelf" boundary which, in most cases,
coincides with the 200-mile EEZ and within which the coastal state has exclusive "sovereign rights"
to explore and exploit natural resources, id. art. 76. See Resource Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 60.
84 LOS, supra note 80, arts. 156-69.
85 Id. art. 170.
86 Id. art. 136.
87 Id. art. 140.




ited from recognizing mining rights asserted outside the LOS system.89
In order to obtain a contract, a mining company must be "sponsored" by
a state party to the LOS and must designate in its application two mining
areas for potential development. Only one of these areas will be awarded
to the company; the other will be reserved by the Authority for explora-
tion and exploitation by the Enterprise. 90 The Authority also selects the
location to be developed by the applicant and access to a specific site is
not assured. 91 In exchange for a license to mine in the Area, the appli-
cant company must: 1) abide by the rules imposed by the Authority; 2)
pay to the Authority a specific portion of the value of its mined re-
sources, or a smaller portion coupled with a specific proportion of the
profits derived from the activity;92 and 3) transfer the technology utilized
in its mining efforts to the Enterprise.
93
The LOS requires that the Authority "provide for the equitable
sharing of financial and other economic benefits" derived from resource
recovery activities.94 The treaty also requires that parties participating in
deep sea mining in the Area shall transfer to the Enterprise the technol-
ogy utilized in those activities on "fair and reasonable commercial
terms."9 The LOS also contains provisions limiting the total number of
contracts that may be issued to a single party. Moreover, the total
number of contracts issued for development in a given location is limited
by a ceiling based upon the amount of materials that may be removed
from that area during a specific time period.96
An important characteristic of the LOS regime is that decisions of
the Authority are made on a one-nation-one-vote basis. Consequently,
most major decisions are controlled by developing countries, which make
up a majority of the member states of the United Nations.97 The Au-
thority is governed by an Assembly consisting of all state parties which,
in turn, is governed by a thirty-six member Council and a Secretariat.
The Council has veto power regarding the adoption of any legally-bind-
ing mining rules and regulations; most substantive decisions require a
89 Id. art. 137.2.
90 Id. annex III.
91 Id. annex III, art. 8.
92 The Authority will use these funds to cover its administrative expenses and then may dis-
tribute the remainder to developing countries. Id. art. 173.
93 Id. art. 144; annex III.
94 Id. art. 140.
95 Id. art. 144, annex III, art. 5(3)(a).
96 Id. art. 15.
97 At the present time, the developed western countries represent only about 20% of the votes at
the U.N. General Assembly. Interview with Brian Hoyle, supra note 10.
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two-thirds or three-fourths vote of the Council.98 Of the thirty-six mem-
bers of the Council, the countries developing the deep sea resources will
hold only approximately eight seats. Thus, it is apparent that the devel-
oping countries and the Eastern Bloc collectively would control licenses
to exploit and use the deep seabed resources.99
The United States refused to sign the LOS when it first opened for
signature in 1982. The United States based its decision on what it per-
ceived to be unfavorable terms of the LOS regime, notwithstanding the
country's long involvement in the negotiations and its approval of most
of the agreement's provisions. Specifically, the United States was con-
cerned that certain provisions of the agreement might deter the develop-
ment of natural resources. These provisions included: 1) the imposition
of specific production guidelines and limits; 2) requirements of
mandatory private technology transfer and benefit sharing; 3) the failure
to give a valid decision-making role to the countries actively involved in
the mining of deep sea resources; 4) the failure to provide assured access
to qualified deep sea mining companies to conduct mining activities;
and 5) terms that the United States felt would set "undesirable prece-
dents for international organizations."101 In August 1984, several non-
signatories of the LOS - including the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, Belgium,
Italy, and the Netherlands - signed a Provisional Understanding Re-
garding Deep Seabed Matters, resolving, between those parties, most is-
sues governing deep seabed mining exploration. 102
D. Replies
As indicated above, many opponents of the Moon Treaty have ex-
pressed concern that the regime adopted in the LOS sets an undesirable
98 LOS, supra note 80, arts. 161-62.
99 Interview with Brian Hoyle, supra note 10.
100 BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 416, THE
OCEAN LAW OF THE SEA AND OCEAN POLICY (1982).
101 BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 371, LAW OF
THE SEA (1982). See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No.
819, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. OCEANS POLICY (1986) (an address by John D. Negro-
ponte, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Mar.
14, 1986).
102 See Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 80 (statement of Leonard J. Theberge); White,
supra note 69, at 532. In addition, the United States adopted the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Re-
sources Act, 30 U.S.C. 1401 (1986). The act acknowledges that investor uncertainty resulting from
the United States delay in signing the LOS would likely discourage investment in mining activities,
id. § 1401(a)(13); provides certain governmental backing of deep sea mineral recovery operations, id.
§ 1472; and requires all mining agreements to guarantee United States citizens access to the deep
seabed, id. § 1411.
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precedent for the adoption of a regime governing outer space resource
development efforts. Moreover, these opponents believe that such a sys-
tem will lead to the adoption of obligations such as required technology
sharing, loss of effective input into rule adoption, anticompetitive market
planning provisions, and inequitable benefit sharing requirements. On
the other hand, proponents of the Moon Treaty point to its many provi-
sions which indicate that other agreements, particularly the LOS, were
not intended to establish a precedent for the regime governing extrater-
restrial resource development.
Proponents of the Moon Treaty note that the common heritage pro-
vision in the Treaty was limited to "the provisions of this Agreement, in
particular, in paragraph 5 of this Article [11],"' 103 and was intended sim-
ply to restate the terms of existing space law (i.e., that no state may pro-
hibit the access to space by others).104 Proponents contend that the
inclusion of this provision had the specific purpose of limiting the mean-
ing of the common heritage provision to the Moon Treaty and did not
extend to other treaties being negotiated at the time.105 Moreover, pro-
ponents note that the resources thought to be obtainable extraterrestri-
ally are very different from those to be exploited from the deep seabed.
Thus, the common heritage principle could have a very different meaning
when applied to these two different areas.10 6 The proponents also note
that the common heritage principle applies to only the resources of the
lunar celestial bodies prior to their removal; after mining, ownership may
be exercised over these resources. 10 7
Supporters of the Moon Treaty also note that the breadth of the
103 Moon Treaty, supra note 49, art. 11 (emphasis supplied).
104 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 12-13 (statement of Roberts B. Owen) ("[T]he U.S.
view was-and is-that this concept [of common heritage] embodies no substantive rules or a pre-
determined form of legal regime .... [The substance and meaning of the Moon Treaty should be
determined independently of other international instruments and negotiations.").
105 See, e.g., Menter, supra note 75, at 188, 193; White, supra note 69, at 529.
106 See Menter, supra note 75, at 190. It may also be that many of the developing countries
voting in favor of the LOS did so not to obtain "benefits" to be derived from deep sea mining
activities, but for the specific purpose of discouraging such activities in order to protect the market
for similar land-based resources they had at their disposal. See Peterson, Antarctic Implications of
the New Law of the Sea, 16 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 137, 164-65 (1986). While it is arguable that
the vast majority of the resources to be found extraterrestrially will include resources that are obtain-
able terrestrially, the great advantage of extraterrestrial mining will be the fact that the resources will
be available in space for further processing in space and would not require transportation of those
resources from the earth to space. See supra note 7. Thus, these same countries that voted in favor
of the LOS and its regime would not necessarily support the adoption of a similar regime to govern
the exploitation of resources in outer space. See Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 8, at 20 (state-
ment of Roberts B. Owen).
107 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 30 (statement of Dr. A. Morissey, Office of the Presi-
dent); id. at 6 (statement of Roberts B. Owen).
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common heritage principle and the rules governing the exploitation of
extraterrestrial resources will be determined in future negotiations which
will address the adoption of a regime governing such exploitation.108
The proponents argue that the United States will have the opportunity to
control the scope of the provision and terms of the regime only if the
United States becomes a party to the Moon Treaty; there will be no such
opportunity if the country refuses to adopt the Moon Treaty itself.1 09
Proponents thus argue that the United States should become a party to
the Moon Treaty in order to preserve the country's opportunity to par-
ticipate in the discussions and negotiations regarding a proposed regime
to control mining activities. These advocates note that the United States
may drop out of such negotiations at any time, as it did in the LOS, if its
position is not adopted.' 10
With regard to the provisions of the Moon Treaty which call for
sharing the benefits derived from resource exploitation, proponents of the
Moon Treaty note that it only requires a sharing in the "benefits" derived
from the resources, not the resources themselves."' Moreover, the
treaty's provisions require only an "equitable," not an "equal," sharing
of those benefits." 2 Thus, it is arguable that the treaty allows the United
States to determine how, and in what manner, it will share in these bene-
fits."' Finally, the proponents of the treaty argue that the United States
108 See Christol, supra note 68, at 478.
109 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 79 (statement of Ronald F. Stowe); Menter, supra
note 75, at 195; Christol, The Moon Treaty Enters Into Force, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 163, 167 (1985).
110 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 69 (statement of R.F. Stowe). See Christol, supra note
109, at 167. Only states acceding to the terms of the regime will be bound by them, as such terms do
not amount to generally accepted customs of international law. Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7,
at 21 (statement of Roberts B. Owen); Interview with Brian Hoyle, supra note 10.
Many opponents of the Moon Treaty additionally feared that by calling for the adoption of the
regime only as exploitation commences, the treaty adopted aper se moratorium on the development
on outer space resources until the international community could agree upon the terms of the re-
gime. See, e.g., Dula, supra note 79. The United States' position in negotiating the Moon Treaty
was exactly contrary to this, stating that the treaty places "no moratorium on the exploitation of
natural resources of the Moon, pending establishment of an international regime." Moon Treaty
Hearings, supra note 7, at 12 (statement of Roberts B. Owen); Dula, supra note 79, at 10-I1 (citing
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.203 (1979)). Commentators note, however, that it is highly unlikely that
the United States would authorize or that any private company would undertake such exploitation
of lunar resources without assurance that it would retain control and title over at least a portion of
the benefits derived from the exploitation. See, e.g., id. at 19.
111 See Menter, supra note 75, at 202.
112 Christol, supra note 109, at 165.
113 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 18 (statement of Roberts B. Owen). The proponents
also note that the benefit-sharing provisions call for consideration not only of the concerns of the
developing countries, but also of "the efforts of those countries which have contributed either di-
rectly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon." Moon Treaty, supra note 49, at art. I1; see
White, supra note 69, at 530.
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could ratify the treaty with "understandings" which set forth the United
States position on the provisions of concern.114 The adoption of such
understandings would legally limit United States obligations under the
treaty." 5 It should be noted that the United States utilized this option
when it adopted the Principles Treaty in 1982.116
Notwithstanding the strong arguments made by proponents of the
Moon Treaty, the United States declined to sign it or to ratify its provi-
sions. Thus, when the Moon Treaty became effective on July 11, 1984,
upon ratification by the fifth signatory, neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union had yet ratified or had become a signatory.117 Neither
country has taken any steps in the intervening time to seek the adoption
of an acceptable treaty. Therefore, no provisions of international law ex-
ist outside the Principles Treaty, the Astronaut Rescue Agreement, or
the Liability and Registration Conventions to govern the exploration and
exploitation of extraterrestrial resources by those states most likely to
undertake these activities.
V. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM
A. Background and Terms
Unlike the currently stalled negotiations concerning the adoption of
a regime governing mineral exploration in outer space, efforts by the par-
ties to the Antarctic Treaty to adopt a regime governing mineral ex-
ploitation in Antarctica have progressed significantly. 118 It now appears
that an acceptable regime could be adopted within the next few years.
As stated above, the Antarctic Treaty was the direct result of efforts
by the United States, in cooperation with other states actively involved in
research or other activities in Antarctica, to impose a legal regime on
future activities on that continent which would be accepted internation-
ally.1 19 As with the LOS and Moon Treaties, the Antarctic Treaty speci-
114 Menter, supra note 75, at 207.
115 Moon Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 69 (statement of Ronald F. Stowe).
116 While art. I of the Principles Treaty provides that "the exploration and use of outer space...
shall be carried out for the benefit ... of all countries," Principles Treaty, supra note 25, art. 1, the
"understanding" upon which the United States' ratification of the treaty was based stated that
"Nothing in Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Treaty diminishes or alters the right of the United States
to determine how it shares the benefits and results of its space activities." Exec. Rep. No. 8 to
Accompany Ex. D. U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 4 (1967); see, Menter, supra note 75, at 207;
Christol, supra note 69, at 450.
117 In comparison, both the Principles Treaty and Astronaut Rescue Agreement require the sig-
natures of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain for the agreements to enter into
force. Christol, supra note 109, at 163.
118 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 66.
I 19 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. As of the date of this Article, twenty countries
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fies that the continent shall be used solely for peaceful purposes and that
activities of a military nature are expressly prohibited.1 20 The treaty pro-
vides that all parties shall enjoy freedom of scientific investigation on the
continent and shall exchange with other parties information obtained in
research activities and research personnel.1 21 Importantly, the treaty
provides that its provisions shall be interpreted neither as a renunciation
nor an affirmation of the previously asserted rights by various countries
to claims of territorial sovereignty over portions of Antarctica. 2 2 In
fact, the treaty states that "[n]o acts or activities taking place while the
present treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting
or denying any claim of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica,"'123 and no
new claim shall "be asserted while the present Treaty is in force."' 124
The Antarctic Treaty is open for accession by "any state which is a
member of the United Nations, or by any other state which may be in-
vited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the contracting par-
ties." 1 25  However, activities on the continent are governed by the
Consultative Parties to the treaty, now numbering eighteen states.' 26
While any country acceding to the treaty's provisions may obtain Con-
sultative Party status by undertaking "substantial scientific research ac-
tivity" in Antarctica, 127 such undertakings are normally well beyond the
budgets of most developing countries. Consequently, the Antarctic
Treaty system is dominated by industrialized countries in the Western
Hemisphere. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany became a
Consultative Party only after establishing an Antarctic research station
program at a cost estimated to be over $100 million.'2 8 The difficulty of
becoming a Consultative Party and obtaining the right to participate in
in addition to the original twelve have adopted the treaty, including, in order of ratification, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Romania, the German Democratic Republic, Brazil,
Bulgaria, the German Federal Republic, Uruguay, Papua New Guinea, Italy, Peru, Spain, People's
Republic of China, India, Hungary, Sweden, Finland, and Cuba.
120 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 66, art. I.
121 Id. arts. II, III.
122 For a list of claimants, see supra note 19.
123 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 66, art. IV. 2.
124 Id. The treaty also provides that nuclear explosions and disposal of radioactive wastes on the
continent are expressly prohibited. The treaty also provides for a system of inspections by the parties
themselves to assure compliance with the treaty. Id. arts. V, VII.
125 Id. art. IX.
126 The Consultative Parties include the United Kingdom, South Africa, Belgium, Japan, the
United States, Norway, France, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, Poland, Argentina, Australia,
Chile, Brazil, the German Fedaral Republic, Uruguay, the People's Republic of China, and India.
127 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 66, art. IX, 1 2. Examples of such activities include "the estab-
lishment of a scientific station or the despatch [sic] of a scientific expedition." Id.
128 See Resource Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 54 n.42 (citing Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of
the Sea: Rethinking the Current Legal Dilemma, 18 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 415, 421 (1981)).
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the resolution of issues affecting Antarctica has been one of the principal
issues addressed during United Nations debates on the Antarctic Treaty
system. t2
9
The Antarctic Treaty establishes only broad principles applicable to
activities on the continent. Consequently, the treaty provides for a series
of meetings to be held among the Consultative Parties for the purpose of
"exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common in-
terest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and
recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Treaty . ,.o"' Subsequent to the
Antarctic Treaty entering into force, the Consultative Parties have held
thirteen such meetings, typically biannually, to address various issues
that have arisen under the treaty system. The vast majority of these
meetings have addressed issues of a scientific nature, such as protection
of the Antarctic environment and setting aside various areas for special
scientific inquiry. Additional issues addressed at these meetings have in-
cluded improvements in the telecommunications capabilities of the Con-
sultative Parties' research bases and measures to address increasing
tourism in Antarctica. At the present time, over 150 recommendations
have been made and adopted by the respective parties' governments. 131
B. Minerals Discussions
The Consultative Parties have taken special steps to address issues
that will arise during any exploitation of mineral resources located in or
on the Antarctic continent. These precautions have been taken, at least
in part, to ensure the continued control over resource development ef-
forts on the continent. For example, at the seventh meeting of the Con-
sultative Parties in 1972, they noted the "increasing interest in the
possibility that there may be exploitable minerals in the Antarctic Treaty
129 See infra text accompanying notes 173-79; Eilers, Antarctica Adjourned? The U.N. Delibera-
tions of Antarctica, 19 INT'L LAW. 1309, 1316 (1985).
130 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 66, art. IX. The decision making process allows representatives
of the Consultative Parties' meeting to adopt recommendations to be made to their respective gov-
ernments on a variety of issues. The recommendations are adopted only after reaching the consensus
of all parties' representatives, and become binding upon the respective parties only when formally
accepted by all Consultative Parties' governments. Parties are often slow to accept of the recommen-
dations because adoption of domestic legislation may be required. See. e.g., Colson, The Antarctic
Treaty System: The Mineral Issue, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 841, 880-81 (1980).
131 At the Eighth Consultative Party meeting in 1984, the parties also entered into the Agreed
Measures for the Conservation of Flora and Fauna, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S. 6058, and later adopted
two conventions with nonparties addressing issues related to Antarctica. These conventions, which
are open to ratification and signature by all countries include: Convention for the Conservation of
Antarctic Seals, 29 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826, and Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Living Resources, T.I.A.S. No. 10240, 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 841 (1980).
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Area" as a result of a growing international concern about the continued
availability of petroleum resources. 13 2 The parties found that such re-
source development would be "likely [to] raise problems of an environ-
mental nature," and concluded that "the Consultative Parties should
assume responsibility for the protection of the environment and the wise
use of resources." '13 3 At the Eighth Consultative Party meeting in 1975,
the parties agreed to exert all "appropriate efforts" to ensure that no one
engage in resource development activity contrary to the principles and
purposes of the Antarctic Treaty.' 34 Similarly, at the Ninth Consultative
Party meeting in 1977, the parties further agreed to continue to "play an
active and responsible role" in establishing a regime to govern Antarctic
mineral resource exploitation activities. 3 ' At that time, the Consultative
Parties also "urge[d] their nationals and other States to refrain from all
exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources while mak-
ing progress toward the timely adoption of an agreed regime in Antarctic
mineral resource activities."' 3 6 In 1979, when the parties held their tenth
meeting, they considered addressing the mineral resource questions in a
series of special meetings to be held in addition to the biannual meetings
and to move forward expeditiously to adopt a regime governing mineral
exploitation activities.
137
The eleventh Consultative Party meeting held in 1981 proved to be a
watershed for the parties' consideration of the mineral exploitation issue.
In the face of growing pressure from developing countries to share in the
benefits of Antarctic mineral resource development, 138 the parties recom-
mended to their governments that a regime on Antarctic mineral re-
sources should be adopted "as a matter of urgency" and that special
Consultative Party meetings should be held to consider and adopt the
terms of such a regime.139 The participating parties urged that the re-
132 Recommendation VII-6, May 29. 1975, Antarctica: Measures in Furtherance of Principles
and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty.
133 Id.
134 Recommendation VIII-14, Dec. 16, 1978, Antarctica: Measures in Furtherance of Principles
and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty.
135 Recommendation IX-I, Sept. 8, 1983, Antarctica: Measures in Furtherance of Principles and
Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty.
136 Id. 8.
137 Recommendation X-1, adopted at the Tenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Wash-
ington. D.C., Sept. 17 - Oct. 5, 1979.
138 See infra text accompanying notes 173-79.
139 Recommendation XI-, Report of the Eleventh Consultative Meeting, Buenos Aires, Argen-
tina, June 23 - July 7, 1981. In opening statements to this meeting, the Consultative Parties recog-
nized that a principal purpose of the regime was to display to nonparties the "effectiveness of the
Antarctic Treaty system in adopting rules to govern activities on the continent." Id. Appendix B, at
3 (statement of W.R. Mansfield, Delegate for New Zealand). The parties also noted that the "'ur-
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gime be based on the principles that: 1) the Consultative Parties continue
to play an "active and responsible role" in dealing with the question of
Antarctic mineral resources; 2) the Antarctic Treaty be "maintained in
its entirety;" 3) the protection of the Antarctic environment be treated as
a "basic consideration;" 4) dealings with these issues should not "preju-
dice the interests of all mankind in Antarctica;" and 5) the regime should
not prejudice those states that had previously asserted rights or claims to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 40 Since 1981, eight special meet-
ings of the Consultative Parties or their working groups have been held
to address the issues surrounding the development of Antarctic mineral
resources. 141
C. The Beeby Proposal
The special minerals discussions held to date have principally ad-
dressed a regime proposed, at least in part, in 1983 by Christopher Beeby
of New Zealand.' 4 2 The Beeby proposal states that private entities spon-
sored by state parties, and any state interested in having a state-owned
enterprise or domestic private firm carry out mineral exploitation activi-
ties, would be invited to become a party to the regime without having to
become a Consultative Party to the Antarctic Treaty. 143 Nevertheless, it
is likely that parties to the regime would have to agree to be bound by the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty' 44 as the regime would
be part of the treaty system. 145 All parties to the regime would be al-
lowed to undertake resource development on the Antarctic continent.
146
However, no development would be permitted to take place outside the
regime's provisions" or until sufficient information is available to allow
consideration of the environmental impact of such development 148 and it
gency" in adopting such a regime was in part due to the "impending" conclusion of the Law of the
Sea negotiations. Id. at 1 (statement of P. Tressert, Delegate from Norway).
140 Id. See generally Colson, supra note 130.
141 R.T. Skully, The Antarctic Mineral Resource Negotiations, A Report (1986) (unpublished
manuscript in possession of author). See infra note 143.
142 See Skully, supra note 141, at 11.
143 Peterson, supra note 106, at 147. In a recent speech, however, R. Tucker Skully, Director of
the United States State Department Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs, stated that "[there is a
growing view that being a party to the Antarctic Treaty should be a condition precedent for acces-
sion to the Antarctic mineral resource regime." Skully, supra note 141, at 17-18.
144 Peterson, supra note 106, at 147.
145 Skully, supra note 141, at 21.
146 Id. at 40.
147 Id. at 18.
148 Id. at 19. The Consultative Parties have also agreed that, pending the adopting of the regime,
they will not unilaterally undertake mineral resource exploitation activities and will continue to
apply the voluntary restraints adopted in Recommendation IX-l in 1977. Id.
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is determined that the Antarctic environment would not be affected
adversely. '4 9
Pursuant to the Beeby proposal, resource development activities
would be overseen by an Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission
("Commission"). 5 ° The Commission would consist of the Consultative
Parties and states either engaged in Antarctic resource activity or having
their nationals engaged in such activity. The Commission would appoint
a variety of committees which would focus on specific issues arising from
Antarctic resource development, such as a Scientific, Technical and En-
vironmental Advisory Committee. 5 ' The Commission's decisions con-
cerning resource exploitation proposals would depend principally upon
the risk such activities pose to the Antarctic environment and the man-
ner in which they would be undertaken. 52
The Beeby proposal calls for resource development on the continent
to progress in stages; each stage subject to different criteria. The first
stage is "Prospecting," which incorporates activities aimed at locating
areas of mineral resource potential. Such activities would be permitted
without the prior approval of the Commission as long as the prospector
provided the Commission with notice of the activity and complied with
various standard criteria.15 3 Prospecting would not generate any rights
to resources discovered and the data resulting from the prospecting activ-
ity could be deemed proprietary to the prospector. 54 The second stage,
"Identification of Areas of Development," would require a general deci-
sion by the Commission that a specified area was appropriate for poten-
tial development. 5 5 Such a description would not, however, constitute
the Commission's authorization that specific development may take place
in the area.'
56
The third phase, "Exploration/Development - Pre-Application
Phase," would involve a regulatory committee of the Commission estab-
lishing requirements applicable to development of resources in a specified
area.'5 7 The regulatory committee's decision would take into considera-
tion the advice of technical committees appointed by the Commission to
149 Id.
150 Peterson, supra note 106, at 148. See Skully, supra note 141, at 25. Unlike "enterprise"
potential pursuant to the LOS, the Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission will not undertake
mineral resource exploitation activities itself. Peterson, supra note 106, at 148.
151 Skully, supra note 141, at 27-28.
152 Id. at 29.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 30.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 31-32.
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review a specific development proposal. This decision would be based
upon: 1) the consistency of the proposed development with the terms of
the overall regime; and 2) the "need to ensure that any area identified
constituted a coherent unit from the resource management point of
view."' 58 Ideally, these requirements would give potential developers a
clear picture of the prerequisites to undertaking commercial activity in
the designated area and, consequently, the basis for determining the fea-
sibility of mineral exploration and development activities. 5 9 Applica-
tions for development in the area would not be accepted until the
regulatory committee had specified all requirements applicable to such
development activity."' 0
The final phase, "Exploration/Development - Post-Application
Phase," would provide sponsored developers with the opportunity to ap-
ply for the authority needed to explore for and to develop minerals in
areas approved by the Commission. 6 Applicants would be required to
establish their technical and financial abilities to undertake the proposed
development. They would also be required to demonstrate that all pro-
posed activities are consistent with the regime and the requirements es-
tablished for development.' 62 The Commission's grant of an application
would provide the applicant with the exclusive right to explore, and a
presumptive right to develop, resources found in the specified area.' 63
Applicants would be required to notify the regulatory committee of the
applicant's intention to proceed from exploration to development." 6
The proposal currently being considered by the Consultative Parties does
not articulate standards for deciding among competing applicants for the
same development rights.'6 5 Nevertheless, the parties have agreed that
there should be "maximum incentives" for competition. 166
Several issues remain unresolved between the parties. These include
the methods which will be used to enforce the rules of the regime, inspec-
tion rights, liability assessments, dispute settlement mechanisms, charges
to be imposed upon those undertaking resource exploitation activities,
and the methods of dividing the revenues from these charges. 167 Another
important issue is the decision-making process to be followed by the
158 Id. at 31.
159 Id. at 32.
160 Id. at 35.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 36.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 37.
165 Id. at 36.
166 Id. at 36-37.
167 Id. at 21-24.
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Commission and its committees.1 68 There is a strong preference for the
consensus method adopted by the Antarctic Treaty itself.1 69
The role of parties to the regime which are not Consultative Parties
has been a key issue in these discussions as has the role and opportunity
for nonparties - especially developing countries - to participate in the
mineral development in Antarctica.170 Despite the recognition of the de-
veloping countries' demands to participate in development activities,
there also is "considerable resistance to the establishment of mandatory
obligations for international participation." '171 At the present time the
consensus of the Consultative Parties appears to be that the Commission
should undertake incentives to encourage developing countries to partici-
pate in mineral development efforts, but the parties have rejected the im-
position of mandatory requirements for such participation.'72
D. Concerns of Developing Countries
While the Consultative Parties have advocated the Antarctic Treaty
system as the best example of international cooperation among those
with vested interests in Antarctica, developing countries have sought
mightily to increase their participation in the benefits anticipated from
mineral resource activity on the continent. The developing nations suc-
ceeded in having a "Question of Antarctica" placed on the United Na-
tions General Assembly's agenda in 1983. Pursuant to this question, the
Secretary General of the United Nations was called upon to "prepare a
comprehensive, factual and objective study of all aspects of Antarctica,
taking fully into account the Antarctic Treaty System and other relevant
factors." 173
The Secretary General delivered the report to the General Assembly
in 1984, but debate on the report has, thus far, been deferred. At the
present time, the Consultative Parties and members of the "Group of
77" 174 developing nations are negotiating the terms of proposed General
Assembly resolutions intended to address these issues. Moreover, the de-
168 Id. at 40-41.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 39.
171 Id. at 45.
172 Id.
173 G.A. Res. 77, 38 U.N. GAOR (97th Plen. Mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/77 (Prov. ed. Jan.
1, 1984); Question of Antarctica: Report of the Secretary General (Agenda item 66) U.N. Doc. A/
39/583/Part I (1984). The Secretary General's report describes Antarctica, the history of the regu-
lation of that continent, and the legal and scientific issues confronting exploration and development
of resources on the continent, setting forth various member states' views on the Antarctic Treaty
system and its future.
174 The "Group of 77" was established in 1963 by 77 nonaligned nations, but it now incorporates
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veloping countries have requested the Secretary General to "update and
expand" the earlier study. 17
5
That the Consultative Parties recognize the pressure placed upon
them by the developing nations is indicated by the parties' belief that the
adoption of a regime governing mineral exploitation activities is a matter
of "urgency." 176 The parties clearly believe that the adoption of such a
regime would indicate to the developing countries of the United Nations
that the Consultative Parties are sensitive to regulating affairs concerning
Antarctica in a manner that will benefit all nations. 177 The Consultative
Parties also have agreed to forward detailed reports of their mineral re-
source discussions to the Secretary General for consideration by the Gen-
eral Assembly. 178 Unfortunately, the reports provided to date have not
proven to be extraordinarily illuminating.
VI. FUTURE TREATIES
A. Considerations
It is obvious that many fundamental differences exist between the
terms and conditions of the Antarctic Treaty, the LOS, and the Moon
Treaty. These differences principally reflect the time periods in which
those agreements were negotiated. One difference is that the regulation
of mineral resource activities in Antarctica is governed by those states
currently undertaking, or which have the potential to undertake, such
activities. The world community as a whole governs the regime applica-
ble to activities under the LOS and the proposed Moon Treaty, regard-
less of the specific countries directly involved in the regulated activity.
Another basic difference is that the member states under the Antarctic
Treaty operate by consensus, not majority vote. Amendments to or pro-
visions of that treaty are binding upon parties only to the extent that they
agree with those provisions. 179 Thus, while under the Antarctic Treaty
system the United States has only one vote, the United States is not
over 100 nations. See Young, Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compro-
mise, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 45, 61 n.93 (1985).
175 Id.
176 See Recommendation XI-1, supra note 139.
177 Id. In setting forth the framework for the regime, Recommendation XI-1 specifically noted
that, while the Antarctic Treaty is to be maintained and any regime is to be a part of that treaty, the
regime must not "prejudice the interests of all countries in Antarctica's future." See supra text
accompanying note 140.
178 Interview with Adrienne Stefan, supra note 9.
179 Other obvious differences include the absence in the Antarctic Treaty of technology transfer
provisions, production limitations, and benefit sharing requirements. See supra text accompanying
notes 83-96.
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forced to comply with provisions with which it does not agree. It is im-
portant to note in this regard that the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Par-
ties have never failed to reach a consensus on the issues brought before
them.
From the United States' perspective, the adoption of a regime simi-
lar to the Beeby proposal being discussed among the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties would be most advantageous. It has been suggested
by some that the United States could achieve the adoption of such a re-
gime in outer space simply by refusing to participate in any regime not
characterized by either significant, or possibly dominant, United States
participation. Recent events reveal that there may be merit to this posi-
tion. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union's failure to
adopt or ratify the provisions of the Moon Treaty or the LOS have re-
sulted in those conventions becoming practically irrelevant. 180 The two
countries are the only ones with the technological and financial ability to
develop deep sea, Antarctic, or outer space resources. Thus, a regime
without the participation of these countries is a regime without practical
consequence.18 ' Moreover, by failing to adopt or ratify a treaty gov-
erning certain activities in outer space, nothing prohibits the United
States from going forward, as it has done with the LOS, to form an ap-
propriate convention among other nonsignatory parties or to undertake
unilateral action to develop lunar and other resources. 18 2
Recent events regarding the Moon Treaty, the LOS, and the
Antarctic Treaty system reveal that the United States may not be entirely
free to proceed at its own will. It is generally recognized that the United
States has certain practical as well as moral obligations not to act in a
manner adverse to the interests of other countries, particularly develop-
ing countries.18 3 The United States has found it advantageous for these
reasons to enter into numerous treaties regulating its activities beyond its
180 Similarly, in deliberations at the United Nations during the 1980s, threatened nonparticipa-
tion by the United States became increasingly successful in convincing the General Assembly and its
committees to adopt positions consistent with the United States' objectives. For example, the United
States successfully de-emphasized the politicization of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS and
directed COPUOS' energies in a more scientific and technological direction. Interview with William
Lowell, Deputy Director, Office of Advanced Technology, Bureau of Ocean and Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, July 17, 1986. Similarly, the United States has suc-
ceeded in having arms control and space war issues deleted from the agenda of the Legal Subcom-
mittee of COPUOS and has influenced COPUOS to adopt United States proposed principles to
govern the remote sensing activities of member states. Id.
181 See, e.g., Resource Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 62; Comment, Law in a Vacuum, supra note
7, at 420.
182 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
183 See, e.g., De Seife supra note 13, at 101-02; Christol, supra note 68, at 453; Carroll, supra note
76, at 220; White, supra note 69, at 509 ("a growing consensus maintains that the more advanced
Space Resource Exploitation
7:727(1986)
own territories. Some of these treaties - such as the Principles Treaty
- recognize some characteristic of res communis with regard to the ter-
ritory bound by the treaty.' 84 Similarly, in an effort to obtain the cooper-
ative efforts of its partners in the proposed United States space station, 185
the United States has agreed to a variety of groundrules which signifi-
cantly undercut the United States' ability to dominate the station's af-
fairs.' 8 6 For example, the United States has agreed to share with its
partners overall management authority for the station, to guarantee to its
partners open, continuous, and nondiscriminatory access to the station
via the space shuttle, and even to grant access to the station via other
launch systems in any manner compatible with safe and nondisruptive
operation. 87
Initially, the United States will continue to be confronted with the
requirement that it must seek international accord regarding its activities
in outer space in order to maintain cohesive and amenable relationships
on the ground. Recent steps by developing countries to exercise collec-
tive political power, while not entirely successful, have illustrated to the
United States that strength in numbers renders the developing countries
a force to be reckoned with, even in those areas where the countries are
not actively engaged in resource exploitation activities. The terms
adopted into the LOS and the Moon Treaty reflect this fact and even the
Antarctic Treaty system has been affected by the efforts of developing
countries not party to the Antarctic Treaty.188
Developing countries have successfully made developed countries
consider the former's views and concerns in other areas as well. For
example, the developing nations sought to politicize the 1985 meeting of
the World Administrative Radio Conference ("WARC") of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union.'89 Such meetings are held to allocate
slots in the geostationary orbit for communication satellites and tradi-
tionally have concerned purely engineering matters, such as the ability of
satellites to operate effectively and without interference. Several equato-
members of this [international] community have a duty to help their developing neighbors make
social and economic improvements").
184 It is recognized in this regard that the "province of mankind" language applicable in prior
treaties to extraterritorial locations is not the same as the "common heritage of mankind" language
incorporated into the LOS and the Moon Treaty. See Galloway, The Space Station: United States
Proposals and Implemention, 14 J. SPACE L. 14, 21 (1986).
185 Thus far, the United States has entered into space station joint venture agreements with the
European Space Agency, Japan, and Canada. See infra note 195.
186 Pederson, Space Stations: Risks and Vision, 14 J. SPACE L. 1, 7-8 (1986).
187 Id.
188 See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 46.
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rial countries recently declared, however, that their sovereign territory
included that portion of the geostationary orbit directly above their land
and demanded that slots in the orbit be reserved for their use in the fu-
ture, whether or not they have the capacity or plans to launch satel-
lites.t 90 The United States rejected this rigid a priori allocation scheme.
Instead, the United States proposed not to change the existing first-come-
first-served allocation methodolgy. While the reservation system pro-
posed by the developing countries was rejected at the WARC, the devel-
oping nations succeeded in having the conference adopt an allocation
scheme calling for arcs of space in the geostationary orbit to be allocated
to countries for future operations on specific frequencies.191
It must be recognized that more than half of the countries constitut-
ing the United Nations won independence within the last twenty years.
These countries reject the traditional method of obtaining sovereignty
and benefits through simple occupation of territory. 9 2 They seek to de-
velop industrially quite quickly, hoping to establish a new international
economic order in which developed countries are called upon to assist
developing countries in a modernization campaign.193 Unless the United
States seeks to withdraw from the numerous international organizations
governed by one-nation-one-vote systems - a move which would render
its terrestrial activities extremely difficult - the United States must now
recognize, at least to some extent, developing countries' demands to have
a voice in the development and exploitation of Antarctic and outer space
resources. 194
From a purely practical standpoint, unilateral action by the United
190 Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, Dec. 3, 1976 (the "Bogota Declara-
tion"), reprinted in II N. JASENTULIYANA & R. LEE, MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 383 (1979).
191 The frequencies subject to this arc-allocation system are the expansion bands associated with
the 6/4 GHz and 14/11-12 GHz frequencies. WARC 1985: The Politics of Space, BROADCASTING,
Sept. 23, 1985, at 57, col. 1.
192 For a good discussion of the traditional methods of acquiring sovereignty over unclaimed
land, see Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 14, at 390-97.
193 Comment, Law in a Vacuum, supra note 7, at 422. Through the concurrent effort of individ-
ual developing countries and groups of nonaligned nations, such as the "Group of 77," see supra note
174, the "common heritage" principle has acquired NIEO overtones notwithstanding the opposition
of the United States. See Peterson, supra note 106, at 181-62.
194 Negotiating treaties in a more comprehensive manner will also help avoid some of the incon-
sistencies that the United States has encountered in addressing treaties on a case-by-case basis. For
example, with regard to Antarctica, the United States has refused to recognize any claims of sover-
eignty over portions of the Antarctic continent. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24. A logi-
cal corollary of this position is that the waters off the continent must be considered "high seas,"
subject to the LOS regime governing resource recovery in the "Area." See supra text accompanying
notes 83-99. Efforts to place those resources beyond the reach of unattractive LOS provisions, how-
ever, implies recognition of various claims of sovereignty to portions of the Antartica continent. See
Carroll, supra note 65, at 225.
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States to explore and exploit lunar and other resources would be ex-
tremely inefficient. Such an undertaking would require duplicative re-
search and development, construction, transportation, and management
efforts and activities that could be shared more profitably among numer-
ous countries. As the United States has recognized the practicality of
shared efforts regarding its plan to share the construction of the space
station with Japan, Canada, and the European Space Agency, 195 so will
the world's countries undoubtedly find it advantageous to unify in order
to explore outer space. The early establishment of a predictable method
of sharing the benefits of extraterrestrial resource development also will
lessen the likelihood that inefficient "get-it-while-you-can" activities will
characterize development efforts.
Finally, adoption of an international accord to regulate commercial
activities in outer space and to allocate the benefits of such activities in a
predictable manner would appear to be a prerequisite to financing these
activities. Banks and investors will be reluctant to lend funds to any min-
ing entrepreneur or consortium that did not have the uncontested, or at
least predictable, right to the benefits of the resources it plans to develop
or prospect. Similarly, it cannot be expected that an entrepreneur will
take on the significant risks associated with extraterrestrial mining activi-
ties if its ability to obtain the benefits of those activities is open to ques-
tion. Indeed, were the United States to fail to adopt a regime governing
extraterrestrial resource exploration, it must be anticipated that entrepre-
neurs might seek the protection of parties to such a convention. Thus,
the failure of the United States to secure such an agreement may result in
the United States losing its ability to participate in such activities. 196
B. Proposals
In sum, practicalities as well as moral precepts support the United
States' renewed efforts to secure the adoption of an internationally-
accepted regime to govern commercial (especially mineral) exploitation
activities in outer space. The first step the United States should take is to
initiate the adoption of an acceptable regime, yet recognize that it is un-
likely that such an agreement can be negotiated by the world community.
195 Pederson, supra note 188, at 2 n.3 (citing Memorandum of Understanding for Conduct of
Parallel Definition and Design Studies (Phase B) of Permanently Manned Space Station, June 3,
1985, NASA - European Space Agency; Memorandum of Understanding for Definition and De-
sign Activities Program of Permanently Manned Space Station, May 9, 1985, NASA - Science and
Technology Agency of Japan; Memorandum of Understanding for Definition and Design Program
(Phase B) of Permanently Manned Space Station, Apr. 16, 1985, NASA - Canadian Ministry of
State for Science and Technology).
196 See Christol, supra note 109, at 168.
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The irrelevant LOS and Moon Treaties stand as memorials to such failed
past efforts. Rather, as was suggested by Professor Rodolphe de Seife t97
and pursued by parties actively engaged in deep sea mining activities
198
and the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, the United States should
first seek an agreement between the countries actively engaged in, or real-
istically proposing to become actively engaged in, such activities. Only
in that manner will the consensus of those parties be presented to the
world community as a unified position; only then will such a consensus
have a reasonable chance of adoption by other countries.199
Regarding the substantive terms of a regime governing the develop-
ment of lunar resources, the United States' positions concerning the trea-
ties discussed above indicate that an acceptable treaty could incorporate
significant provisions of the LOS and Moon Treaty as well as the proce-
dures outlined in the Beeby proposal for a regime governing mineral ex-
ploitation in Antarctica.20 0  For example, the agreement could
incorporate the regulation of such activities by an international body,
similar to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
("INTELSAT") or the International Maritime Satellite Organization
("IMARSAT"), with seats on the governing board held, in part, by de-
veloping countries not capable of undertaking such activities. Access to
development sites would be guaranteed to all states acceding to the treaty
and specific sites might even be reserved for development by developing
countries, either directly or through contracts with countries taking an
active role. The United States might even accept the creation of a trans-
national entity similar to the LOS Enterprise, as long as that entity were
not empowered to compete unfairly with private development efforts.
Indeed, it is likely that most of the terms of the draft Moon Treaty could
be retained, 20 1 provided that the following terms were incorporated into
the agreement:
1. Ultimate control over the regime governing exploitation activities must
197 De Seife, supra note 13, at 102-03.
198 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
199 If the understanding of such efforts appears to be unlikely, the passage of an extraterrestrial
mineral resources law similar to the Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act adopted during the long
LOS negotiation could be considered. Id.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 142-72.
201 It may also be possible for the United States to accept the incorporation of a "common heri-
tage" provision into the agreement, as long as that language was limited by all parties to a narrower
definition than that presently proposed by developing countries. See supra text accompanying notes
71-79. For example, it has been suggested that the provision could be interpreted within traditional
notions of sovereignty and private property, as was incorporated into the United States position that
the common heritage provision guarantees equal access to resources, but that the developers of the
resources retain ownership over the resources they develop and the benefits that flow therefrom. See
Comment, Law hi a Vacuum, supra note 7, at 427-30.
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not be granted to parties that are not actively engaged in development ef-
forts. While developing countries may have a valid claim to a vote in the
adoption and implementation of such a regime, i.e., an opportunity to con-
vince others to adopt certain views, these countries do not have a valid
claim to dictate the terms of that regime contrary to the will of the coun-
tries subject to the risks associated with the activities;
2. Parties to the regime must not be obligated to comply with terms or
amendments adopted without their consent or approval; and
3. The regime should not incorporate wholesale and predetermined trans-
fers of technology or wealth to parties not undertaking development activi-
ties. It must be noted that many countries (including, increasingly, the
United States) have only technology to export. The requirement that coun-
tries be obligated to transfer such technology in order to receive the oppor-
tunity to participate in outer space commercial activities virtually assures
their lack of participation.20 2
The adoption of a regime incorporating the considerations outlined
above is not the only possible method of resolving the present standoff in
international efforts to develop a regime governing commercial activities
in outer space. A very different alternative would be for the world com-
munity to adopt, for extraterrestrial mineral claims, a system similar to
the patent system enforced in the United States. The principal basis of
the United States patent system is that the inventor receives the exclusive
right to enjoy the benefits that flow from the invention for a fixed term of
years in return for disclosing the invention to the public. 20 3 The patent
system is enforced under the laws of the United States and is regulated by
the Patent and Trademark Office, an independent agency established ex-
clusively for that purpose.
By analogy, parties or states undertaking the significant risks in-
volved in outer space mineral development could be granted exclusive
rights to the benefits of those developments for a fixed term of years.
After that period, other parties would be given the opportunity to partici-
pate and to utilize the technology relied upon in the exploitation.2 0  A
202 In the words of the United States Supreme Court:
[A]nd it cannot be doubted that the settled purpose of the United States has ever been, and
continues to be, to confer on the authors of useful inventions an exclusive right in their inven-
tions for the time mentioned in their patent. It is the reward stipulated for the advantages
derived by the public from the exertions of the individual, and is intended as a stimulus to these
exertions.
Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832) (J. Marshall, Ch.J.).
203 It has been proposed that the United States and other developed countries participating in
exploitation activities could adopt their own regime without any involvement of the developing
countries, while agreeing to provide a certain degree of benefit or equivalent wealth sharing with
them. Resource Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 76. Such an alternative would appear shortsighted,
however, and assuredly will complicate international relations.
204 Other suggested alternatives have included granting joint jurisdiction over resources or adop-
ting a regime similar to the INTELSAT or INMARSAT systems whereby a commercial corporation
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transnational regulatory authority similar to the European Patent Office
in Munich could be empowered with authority to serve as the depository
of outer space development "patents" binding on all parties, issue patent
grants, and resolve disputes between parties. Another alternative would
be for interested states to establish the equivalent of the Paris Union,
created pursuant to the Paris Convention of 1882. This organization
would not create a separate transnational patent system, but would rec-
ognize for a term of years other parties' claims to extraterrestrial mining
rights and technology.
The specific terms of the regime to be adopted are not the most im-
portant issues. It is the undertaking by the United States to adopt an
acceptable regime which is the crucial step. The most convenient
timeframe for such efforts would be the International Space Year
("ISY") which was recently proposed by President Ronald W. Reagan
and Congress for the year 1992.205 That year will be the thirty-fifth anni-
versary of the IGY, which "ushered in the space age."' 2 6 The anniver-
sary also will come only one year after the Antarctic Treaty is scheduled
to be reviewed by its parties, two years before the Moon Treaty is sched-
uled to be reviewed by its parties, 20 7 and a few years before the space
station is scheduled to be operational.20 ' The coincidence of relevant
events provides an ideal opportunity for industrialized and developing
countries to structure an acceptable regime governing outer space re-
source recovery activity and to ensure the peaceful exploration and ex-
ploitation of suspected resources.
The President proposed that a major objective of the ISY should be
to "emphasize the involvement of both the developed countries and the
developing countries in ways that demonstrate the benefits to everyone
from discoveries in space science and the practical utilization of
space."' 20 9 In light of the lofty goals and demanding timetables set forth
in the recent report by the National Commission on Space, holding such
negotiations as soon as practicable clearly would be in the best interest of
would be created by state parties to undertake regulated activities. See Moon Treaty Hearings, supra
note 7, at 173 (statement of Eilene Galloway).
205 On May 15, 1986, President Reagan submitted to the Congress a report describing the desira-
bility of holding in 1992 an ISY modeled after the IGY of 1957-59. International Space Year, 22
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 638 (May 15, 1986). The United States proposed the ISY to 28 sepa-
rate countries actively involved in space-based activities and received affirmative support from all
respondents. Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. See supra note 64.
208 See supra note 12.
209 See supra note 205.
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the United States' stagnant space program. 2 ' ° Given the present interna-
tional climate and technological capabilities of potential developers, steps
must be undertaken soon to assure that United States interests are fully
protected when large-scale commercial activities in outer space begin.
210 Although development of Antarctic resources is not expected to occur until the next century,
Skully, supra note 141 (Introductory Notes to the Press), the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties
some time ago recognized the desirability of undertaking the long process of negotiating the adop-
tion of an agreement to govern these activities. In Antarctica, as on the Moon, development might
be some years away, but the first step to that development - prospecting - could begin very soon.
